Husserl’s Early Genealogy of the Number System by Byrne, Thomas
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – XI (2) / 2019 
402 
 
META: RESEARCH IN HERMENEUTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 
VOL. XI, NO. 2 / DECEMBER 2019: 402-428, ISSN 2067-3655, www.metajournal.org 
 
 
 
Husserl’s Early Genealogy of the Number System* 
 
Thomas Byrne 
The Husserl Archives, KU Leuven 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article accomplishes two goals. First, the paper clarifies Edmund 
Husserl‟s investigation of the historical inception of the number system from 
his early works, Philosophy of Arithmetic and, “On the Logic of Signs 
(Semiotic)”. The article explores Husserl‟s analysis of five historical 
developmental stages, which culminated in our ancestor‟s ability to employ 
and enumerate with number signs. Second, the article reveals how Husserl‟s 
conclusions about the history of the number system from his early works 
opens up a fusion point with his investigations from his mature texts, The 
Crisis of the European Sciences and “The Origin of Geometry”. On the one 
hand, the essay shows that Husserl‟s methodology was similar, as he sought 
in both his early and late writings to uncover the essence of the history of the 
formal sciences and was not executing mere intellectual history. On the other 
hand, the article discloses that Husserl‟s insights from both time periods are 
strikingly analogous.  Already in his early texts, Husserl saw that the 
sciences emerged from pre-theoretical experiences of the world and that the 
sciences are the result of a historical process, which involves the psychic 
activities of past individuals and the maintaining of discoveries over time by 
intersubjective communities. I conclude by showing how, in light of the 
analysis of this paper, we can rethink the evolution of Husserl‟s philosophy. 
 
Keywords: Husserl; philosophy of arithmetic; semiotics; history of science; 
genealogy.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The overarching goal of Edmund Husserl‟s 1891 
Philosophy of Arithmetic (Hua XII; Husserl 2003. Hereafter 
PA) is to clarify the contemporary execution of arithmetic 
                                                          
* The article was composed with funding from KU Leuven Internal Funds. 
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calculation by tracing it back to its origin in our everyday 
experience of number. Husserl demonstrates how the practice 
of arithmetic develops naturally and logically from those 
simple encounters with numbers. To begin this investigation, 
Husserl clarifies that I first experience numbers when I am 
“authentically presented” with them (Cf. Hua XII, 10–21; 
Husserl 2003, 15–22). During such authentic presentations, I 
have an in-person and immediate awareness of the number. I 
experience, what Husserl would later call, an “eidetic 
intuition” of the number species and I see that the number 
species applies to the counted elements of the multiplicity as a 
whole (Tillman 2012, 145).  
These authentic presentations are not the only way I 
experience numbers. In fact, I am authentically presented with 
numbers in very few cases. Husserl claims that, as a result of 
the limitations of our psychic capacities, humans are capable of 
authentically presenting only those number species that are 
less than or equal to five, ten, or twelve, depending upon which 
quote one pulls from the text.1 As one cannot authentically 
present these higher numbers, a tool was created by means of 
which one can be presented with, count, and solve arithmetical 
equations that concern or contain them; namely, number signs. 
I somehow become conscious of the numbers 38, 349, or 8,784 
when I read the corresponding signs on the page. Husserl states 
that this manner of becoming aware of numbers via signs is a 
case of “inauthentic presentation”. The number signs 
inauthentically present their higher numbers (Cf. Hua XII, 
193–195; Husserl 2003, 205–207). The number sign does not 
provide me with a direct awareness of the number species. 
Rather, I am conscious of the number species via mediation of 
the concept.2 When I employ the number sign, “13”, the sign 
signifies the number species by way of the concept. The concept 
circumscribes the number species for me. It is these kinds of 
experiences, where I use the number signs to signify the 
number species via the concept, which Husserl calls the 
conceptual employment of signs. 
This conceptual method is also not employed in all cases. 
When arithmetical calculation becomes very complex, I have to 
do without the concepts and use the number signs alone. 
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Husserl wrote that for mathematicians, “It is a fact that in 
praxi all numbering and calculating could dispense with 
recourse to the underlying concepts” (Hua XII, 242; Husserl 
2003, 256). Here, the manipulation of the signs themselves 
stands in the place of not only the authentic presentation of the 
number species, but also the conceptual employment of the 
number sign. I use the signs themselves to come to the correct 
answer to the equation, rather than having to work with the 
concepts or the species. 
Because of the complexity of the development of 
arithmetical calculation, Husserl spends nearly the entirety of 
PA tracing back the execution of contemporary arithmetic to 
our authentic presentation of numbers. Yet, Husserl was not 
content with performing that analysis alone. In a most curious 
and little studied passage from the end of chapter seven, 
Husserl employs his insights about the grounding of arithmetic 
calculation in our daily lives to develop a radical and new 
element of his philosophy.  In the section entitled, “The Natural 
Origination of the Number System” (Hua XII, 244–252; Husserl 
2003, 258–267), Husserl executes what can only be called a 
genetic-historical3 examination of the inception of number signs 
and the number system. He studies the different historical 
stages of sign development, which culminated in the first 
instance of the number system for primitive mankind. He 
searches, in that section, to make “intelligible how, in general, a 
sign system, that is artificial in its type and constitution, and 
whose consciously intended invention and theoretical 
justification would require abstract reflections of the most 
complicated sort, can come about through the course of natural 
psychological evolution” (Hua XII, 253; Husserl 2003, 259). 
With regards to, “The Natural Origination of the 
Number System”, the paper has two goals. First, the essay 
simply elucidates Husserl‟s early and extra-ordinary 
conclusions about the historical psychological generation of 
number signs and the number system. This task is; however, 
more complicated than it initially appears. In PA, Husserl does 
not provide the reader with enough information to fully grasp 
his historically-minded insights. He justifiably conducts his 
historical examination as an aside, because it is tangential to 
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the main objectives of his book. Husserl was fortunately not 
unaware of the limitations of that genetic investigation. 
Accordingly, in an often-overlooked4 18915 manuscript, entitled, 
“On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)” (Hua XII, 340–373; Husserl 
1994, 20–51 [Hereafter LZ]), Husserl supplements that 
historical investigation from PA. In LZ, he clarifies certain 
conscious mechanisms, which he did not properly discuss in PA, 
that allowed for the evolution of sign usage for primitive 
mankind. Accordingly, I will synthesize Husserl‟s insights from 
both PA and LZ to present a comprehensive and accurate 
picture of his early historical insights. 
The second objective of the paper is to demonstrate how 
Husserl‟s 1891 philosophy of the historical origination of the 
number system prefigures his mature philosophical writings 
about the history of the sciences. Indeed, those familiar with 
Husserl would have already noted that his historical 
investigations from PA and LZ appear anachronistic, as they 
bear a striking similarity to Husserl‟s examinations from his 
final works, The Crisis of the European Sciences (Hua VI; 
Husserl 1970a [Hereafter KW]) and, “The Origin of Geometry” 
(Hua VI; Husserl 1970b [Hereafter UG]). Indeed, in all four 
texts – PA, LZ, KW, and UG – Husserl traces formal scientific 
projects back to historical psychic accomplishments in the world 
of pre-scientific experience. The paper will show that such 
similarities are by no means superficial. Naturally, in his first 
writings, Husserl could not yet have formulated his conclusions 
about history in the same terms or with the same nuance that 
he did in KW and UG. In the 1890s, he had not discovered 
concepts such as meaning-sedimentation, life-world, horizon, or 
passivity, amongst others. Despite this fact, the essay 
demonstrates that many of the methods and key ideas, which 
would play an important part in Husserl‟s last writings on 
history and science, were already well developed in his early 
texts. In other words, the second goal of the article is to reveal a 
fusion point between Husserl‟s writings from the 1890s and the 
1930s. 
To accomplish these objectives, the paper is divided into 
two further sections. In section two, I address Husserl‟s 
examination of the inception of number signs and the number 
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system from LZ and PA. In section three, I then demonstrate 
how his method and insights from the early texts prefigure his 
historical analysis from KW and UG. I then conclude by briefly 
demonstrating how this connecting point, between Husserl‟s 
immature and mature writings, reveals an inadequacy with 
and frustrates contemporary interpretations of the evolution of 
his philosophy. 
 
2. Husserl’s Early Historical Genetic Analysis of the 
Origin of the Number System  
 
In the following sections, I investigate Husserl‟s analysis 
of the historical generation of the number system, as he 
described it in LZ and PA. Before broaching Husserl‟s 
observations; however, it is necessary to more clearly outline 
the goals of this historical-genetic analysis and to examine the 
methodology employed during its undertaking. To be certain, 
Husserl‟s investigation is not an attempt to provide an accurate 
historical account of the development of arithmetic in, for 
example, ancient Greece, Egypt, or China. He writes that, “The 
periods within which the origination of number systems and 
number sign systems falls are unknown to any historical 
tradition. Therefore there can be no thought of a reproduction 
of the historical development.” (Hua XII, 245; Husserl 2003, 
259) Husserl sees that his theory must rather account for how 
arithmetic arose during its independent “discovery by different 
peoples, which is deducible with certainty from the existing 
differences (e.g. the choice of the base number of the system), 
found alongside all commonalities” (Hua XII, 245; Husserl 
2003, 259). Husserl is also not seeking to demonstrate that the 
evolution of the number system depends or is contingent either 
upon the psychological composition of the human mind or on 
the particular factical developments of human history. He does 
not here – nor anywhere in PA – psychologize or historicize the 
number system or arithmetic.6 Instead, while still accounting 
for the “general traits of human nature”, Husserl‟s true 
objective is to disclose the “psychological evolution of such 
formations …  in all its essential points” (Hua XII, 245; Husserl 
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2003, 259). He hopes to show what is essential or necessary in 
the historical inception of the number system.7 
Methodologically considered, Husserl executes his 
analysis by identifying and exploring five stages of the 
psychological evolution of the number system.  The grounding 
assumption of Husserl‟s theory is that the ancients were able to 
enumerate with inauthentic number signs and thereby develop 
the number system, because they had mastered the use of other 
kinds of signs first. There is a chain of increasingly more 
complex kinds of signs, where one must first be able to utilize 
the simplest kind of sign before one is capable of learning the 
next and more elaborate kind of sign in the series (Hua XII, 
250–251; Husserl 2003, 263–265). Keeping in mind the goals of 
Husserl‟s overall historical-genetic analysis, in what follows, I 
examine how Husserl describes each of the developmental 
historical stages, which were necessary for the inception of the 
number system. 
 
2.1 Natural Mediating Signs 
 
The necessity of bringing in LZ to augment Husserl‟s 
historical analysis from PA is clear from the start, because his 
examination from the latter begins too late in humanity‟s 
development. In PA, Husserl initiates his investigation by 
looking at the second stage of this historical development – not 
the first. Husserl, in the 1891 book, examines how humans 
came to formulate the simplest kinds of number signs. Yet, in 
LZ, Husserl asserts that certain other experiences are 
necessary even before the creation of number signs is possible. 
In that manuscript, Husserl examines this first stage of 
development, which opens up the possibility of sign creation; 
namely, the experience of “natural signs” (Cf. Hua XII, 345–
346; Husserl 1994, 24–25). 
Even though Husserl, in LZ, does not thoroughly 
describe natural signs, the meaning behind this term can be 
made clear on the basis of his analysis. An example will help. 
As is well known, when cooking meat over a fire, it goes from a 
bright red to a brown color. Eating meat when it is red can be 
dangerous, as parasites and diseases may remain in the meat. 
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Yet, when brown, the meat is safe to eat (albeit, less savory). 
After years of cooking meat on an open fire, the ancients would 
have had many experiences of themselves or other‟s contracting 
certain illnesses after eating red meat and they would have 
experienced a certain rejuvenation after eating meat, which 
was cooked until it was brown. As a result, there could become 
established an association (an associative link) between the 
brown color of the meat and its healthiness.  For the early 
Husserl, this association is the mechanism behind the signitive 
operation of natural (and all) signs. Once that associative link 
is installed, when the villager, who is cooking the meat, sees 
that the meat has a brown color, the associative link, which has 
been sedimented, is reactivated. The authentic presentation of 
the brown-ness of the meat would associatively awaken an 
awareness of the healthiness of the meat. The brown would 
function as a sign, as it – by means of association – points beyond 
itself, that is, signifies the meat as healthy. Husserl calls this 
sign and others like it, “natural”, because they are not the result 
of human invention, but rather arose organically through man‟s 
pre-theoretical experiences of the world. 
Of importance is that a natural sign – if it is univocal 
and sufficient to pick out the signified object – is a “temporary” 
inauthentically presenting sign or a “mediating” sign.8 In LZ, 
Husserl describes these (simplest) kind of signs as, “mere 
intermediaries for the production of authentic representations 
corresponding to them” (Hua XII, 351; Husserl 1994, 31). When 
mediating signs signify by means of association, they lead or 
prompt me to authentically present their signified objects. They 
function by means of mediation and not via replacement. For 
the above example, when villagers would be authentically 
presented with the meat as brown, the brownness would 
function as a natural mediating sign, which would have 
associatively prompted the villagers to authentically present 
the meat as healthy. 
 
2.2 Conventional Mediating Signs 
 
The second phase of historical sign development occurs 
on the basis of the first. In LZ, Husserl concludes that once 
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cavemen had “the capacity for understanding signs”, which 
would arise organically or naturally, then and only then would 
they have the capacity to create signs, which he calls – for 
obvious reasons – “conventional” signs (Cf. Hua XII, 349–350; 
Husserl 1994, 28–29). The ancients needed to see that the one 
object can mediate our awareness of another, that is, signify the 
other, before they could themselves fashion conventional signs. 
Husserl writes that, “the natural modes of procedure must 
precede that of the conventional” (Hua XII, 366; Husserl 1994, 
44).  At the same time, Husserl emphasizes that that 
realization is not enough. After recognizing the mediating and 
signifying power of signs, our ancestors would then have also 
had to employ their will to fashion a sign, which was meant to 
communicate something to others or to themselves (Hua XII, 
345; Husserl 1994, 24–25).  
To return to the above example, if, after realizing that 
the brownness of meat awakens an awareness of the 
healthiness of meat (that is, functions as a sign, which 
associatively signifies the meat‟s healthiness), one caveman 
could use certain berries and the bark of trees to create a brown 
paste, where he could then “paint” certain warriors, who were 
most healthy and skilled, with a brown color. By doing so, that 
ancient person would be employing his will to conventionally 
use what was initially a natural sign. He would be willfully 
marking the warriors with signs, which could signify to others 
the fact that these warriors are most healthy and robust. When 
the warriors would be authentically presented to the villagers 
with the brown paste covering their bodies, the previously 
established associative link between brownness and healthiness 
could be reawakened. The brownness would function as a sign, 
which would signify the healthiness of the warriors for the 
villagers, as the brownness-sign on the warriors would prompt 
the villagers to authentically present the warriors as healthy.  
Importantly, Husserl claims that these first conventional signs 
are also, like the simplest natural signs, mediatory signs. 
Conventional signs were first created to mediate others‟ 
authentic awareness of the signified. The brown paste on the 
warriors would not replace, but rather mediate the villagers‟ 
authentic presentation of the warriors as healthy. 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – XI (2) / 2019 
410 
 
Husserl asserts that this first creation of conventional 
signs is possible on the basis of the experience of natural signs, 
because both operate by means of the same mechanism; namely 
the association that prompts the authentic presentation of the 
signified object. The difference between them is that 
conventional signs were created by humans by using their will. 
Indeed, because they both function via mediating association, 
this jump from natural to conventional signs is easy to make, 
such that, “we should not be amazed when animals make 
themselves understood through signs, to a certain extent” (Hua 
XII, 345; Husserl 1994, 25). At the same time, even though they 
both function by means of the same associative mechanism, 
Husserl asserts that conventional signs open many possibilities 
for communication and knowledge, which were otherwise closed 
off. He writes that, “For the conventional techniques do not 
merely do the same thing better than the natural ones. Rather, 
they do incomparably more” (Hua XII, 366; Husserl 1994, 44). 
On the basis of the above remarks, it is possible to 
explore Husserl‟s genetic-historical analysis of the number 
system from PA, which begins at this second stage. Without 
mentioning that our forbearers must have first understood the 
power of natural signs before they could have fashioned 
conventional signs, Husserl just starts his discussion with an 
examination of the creation of the conventional signs, which can 
mediate the authentic awareness of number species. He states 
that, among the ancestors, there must have been an interest in 
sensible groups of the same kind and that there would be a 
“drive to communicate concerning the events of practical life, in 
which determinate groups of such objects played a great role” 
(Hua XII, 245–246; Husserl 2003, 260). There was, for example, 
a practical need for accurately determining how many sheep 
were in a herd and whether one of the sheep had been eaten by 
a wolf the previous night. This need could be met, Husserl 
claims, via, “an imitation9 by sensible means of the things 
represented”. There needed to be discovered some sensible 
objects, which could clearly “imitate” the objects, whose amount 
needed to be determined.  These imitating objects should be 
easy to access and clearly differentiated from each other. For 
Husserl, the objects, which could perform this function, are self-
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evidently the fingers on the hand. He writes that fingers would 
“have come immediately to mind for the imitation and 
symbolization of corresponding groups of arbitrary other 
objects” (Hua XII, 246; Husserl 2003, 260). 
It was not enough; however, for the ancients to have 
recognized that the fingers could imitate groups of objects, for 
those fingers to function as signs, which mediate our authentic 
awareness of the number species and number concepts. 
Number concepts and number species also have a generality, 
which needs to be realized. Number species are not instantiated 
in just one group of objects alone, but are rather instantiated in 
any concrete multiplicity, which contains that number of 
objects. Moreover, the concept, to which the finger sign refers 
(and can mediate our awareness of the species) is also 
applicable to any number of groups, which have that same 
number of members. In order to realize this generality, Husserl 
states that cavemen had to look back and forth between, on the 
one hand, different groups of the same number (for example, 
three arrows, three sheep, three warriors) and, on the other, the 
fingers (the three fingers that are held up). By doing so, they 
would see that the three fingers serve as a sign that can signify 
all of the different groups of three objects, where this would 
allow for a recognition of the generality of the species or 
concept. Husserl writes that, it was “only through constant 
back-reference from groups of the most various types to the 
finger groups, sharply distinct in sensible appearance [that] 
finger numbers rise to the level of representatives of general 
concepts” (Hua XII, 246; Husserl 2003, 260). 
Finally, with the willful creation of the conventional 
mediating finger signs, the ancients could begin enumeration. 
According to Husserl, enumeration with finger signs must have 
been initially very difficult and would have required a great 
deal of psychic energy.10 In order to enumerate in a secure 
manner, our ancestors would have to work through every single 
number to reach higher numbers, where they would raise one 
finger to represent each of the members of the group. For the 
first member, the pointer finger could have been raised, for the 
next member, the middle finger, then the ring finger, and so on 
(Hua XII, 246–247; Husserl 2003, 261). This sequencing of 
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numbers by our forebears represented the dawn of the number 
system for mankind. 
 
2.3 Surrogates 
 
While enumeration represented an important step 
forward in the historical development of the number system, in 
its first form, it was still very limited. During the period when 
humans only had access to mediating signs, which are the first 
kind of signs that were discovered, they would have only ever 
been able to enumerate up to the number 12. To understand why 
this is the case, we remember first, that only numbers up to 12 
can be authentically presented, and second, that mediating 
number signs prompt the authentic presentation of numbers. 
With these two ideas in mind, we can say that if I saw the 
number sign 13, and if that sign functioned as a mediating sign, 
it would prompt me to authentically present the number 13. Yet, 
this is impossible, because – as was discussed in the introduction 
– the number 13 cannot be authentically presented. As such, it 
seems that the number sign 13 and any greater number signs 
could not signify its number species nor signify at all. 
Yet, Husserl claims that enumeration, “could be 
continued beyond [the narrow domain of authentic 
representations]” (Hua XII, 246; Husserl 2003, 261). This was 
only possible for ancient peoples when they were equipped with 
a new kind of sign, which could signify non-authentically-
presentable numbers. The discovery of these novel signs, which 
Husserl terms, “surrogates”, “replacements”, or “permanently 
inauthentically presenting signs”, is the third stage of historical 
sign development. A surrogative sign does not prompt one to 
authentically present the signified. Instead, when the number 
sign 13 functions as a surrogate, it can signify the number 
concept, even though that number is never authentically 
presented. The number surrogate simply deflects consciousness 
to the non-apparent or not-authentically-presented signified 
object.11 By means of this replacing or deflecting function, 
surrogates allowed for ancients to count beyond those numbers, 
which could be authentically presented.  
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Concerning surrogates, it should also be noted that 
while they are different from mediating signs, the former also 
operate by means of the same general mechanism as the latter; 
association. The object, which will be the surrogate, also must 
first be associatively tied to a signified object, such that when I 
again see the surrogate, that associative link is reawakened, 
where the surrogate deflects me to or replaces the other 
signified and not authentically presented object. 
The specific historical details of the evolution of 
mediating signs into surrogates are only briefly discussed by 
Husserl in LZ. He writes, “Only in consequence of constant 
usage, with the associations which develop, and occasionally 
also through experimentation – or through a mixture of the two 
– do conventional signs (provided they are actually suited for it) 
assume the character of surrogates” (Hua XII, 366; Husserl 
1994, 44–45). In this quote, Husserl is affirming that the 
forbearers did not create conventional signs to function as 
surrogates. Conventional signs were first created as mediating 
signs. Yet, some conventional signs naturally evolved to become 
surrogates. Indeed, the fashioning of signs as surrogates could 
only occur at much later stages of history.  Husserl writes, “We 
already have a high developmental level of spiritual culture 
when we invent conventional surrogates with full consciousness 
of their function” (Hua XII, 367; Husserl 1994, 45). It can; 
therefore, be concluded that fingers originally served as 
mediating conventional signs and that, only after their 
continual usage, did they then assume the character of 
surrogates. It can also be claimed that each of the three now 
outlined stages of development follow each other 
chronologically. By first experiencing natural mediating signs, 
ancients were then able to use their will to craft conventional 
mediating signs. Finally, these conventional mediating signs 
organically became conventional surrogative signs.12 
By employing surrogates, our ancestors could then 
enumerate beyond the limits of authentic presentation. When 
discussing this development of enumeration, Husserl provides a 
more explicitly historical analysis and even employs numerous 
anthropological examples to support his case. He again begins 
at the simplest level, stating that ancient men would count up 
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to five using the fingers on one hand, before using their other 
hand to count up to ten. Here, the ancients ran into a dilemma 
– a fortuitous dilemma – that could only be solved by creating a 
more advanced number system. Simply stated, the dilemma is; 
how should they continue to count beyond ten? There were no 
more fingers for them to count on and it seemed that this was 
thus the upper limit of enumeration. Yet, Husserl claims that 
the continuation of counting was possible, by making a note, 
which would allow for the cavemen to remember that they had 
already counted through all ten fingers. He writes that, “there 
obviously remained nothing left but to make a note – on the 
side, by a sensible sign – of the fact that the fingers had been 
numbered through once, and then to count off the objects yet 
remaining by means of the finger again” (Hua XII, 247; Husserl 
2003, 261–262). In this case, the mark on the side operates as a 
surrogate. When cavemen saw this mark, they were not 
motivated to authentically present the ten objects; rather, the 
mark served to replace and signify the counting through of the 
ten fingers, which had already occurred. This solution would be 
reapplied when ten marks on the side became noted, that is, 
when all ten of the fingers were counted through ten times. A 
new sign would be created, which would signify the ten 
counting through of the ten fingers. To clarify exactly what he 
means with this idea, Husserl draws in an example from the 
anthropologists, E.B. Taylor. According to Taylor, the villagers 
in south east Asia enumerate, “by using in counting a small 
stone for the ones. When ten of these are together, they are 
replaced with a small piece of coconut shell. When ten of these 
latter are together, then a larger piece of coconut shell is used” 
(Hua XII, 247; Husserl 2003, 262). 
Importantly, by utilizing their fingers and marks or 
coconut shells in this way for counting, cavemen had 
established a system of counting that was recursive. Once the 
cavemen had counted through all of the fingers once, after 
making a note on the side, they would begin the process over, 
by starting to count with the first finger again. They would go 
back to the first finger every time all of the fingers had been 
counted. This method of “restarting” the counting is what 
makes the system recursive. Moreover, this recursive system 
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was also a decimal system, because the number at which the 
counting restarted was ten. When all ten fingers were counted, 
the counting would start back with the first finger after the 
mark had been made. Ten thus became the “base number” of 
this recursive system – hence the term decimal. Husserl 
summarizes these important points, by writing that, “In this 
way one was led to a general procedure for the enumeration of 
groups, through which each larger number is already 
constructed in the form of a polynominal function of powers of 
ten” (Hua XII, 247; Husserl 2003, 262). 
 
2.4 Language Signs 
 
Soon after the invention of sign language and the 
manipulation of small tokens, Husserl concluded that 
conventional language signs were created and used to signify 
numbers. The word signs themselves and the method of 
enumeration with word signs; however, did not somehow stand 
apart from enumeration with fingers and tokens. Instead, the 
latter serves as the foundation for the former. Husserl writes 
that the way in which enumeration was developed with the 
word signs, “was not merely a “fortunate move”, but rather was 
a necessary consequence of the further development of counting 
with fingers” (Hua XII, 250; Husserl 2003, 264). How is this the 
case? On the one hand, the first several word number signs 
were, “a mere translation of finger numbers into word 
numbers” (Hua XII, 246; Husserl 2003, 261).  The first finger 
was translated into 1, one finger and one finger was translated 
into 2, one and one and one finger was translated into 3. 
On the other hand, the method of enumeration was a 
direct working out of the method of enumeration with fingers. 
We know that when the ancients finished counting with both 
hands, they would set aside a mark and begin again. This 
starting over at ten established that number as the base 
number of the system. That is, it established the recursive 
decimal system. Because that base number was already 
established, when ancients began to enumerate using word 
signs, they counted in a recursive manner and often employed 
ten as the base number for their system. When they reached 
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ten number words and wanted to add one more item, they also 
would begin the process over. This time; however, they did not 
add a mark to the side to signify that the first ten digits had 
been run through, but rather placed a “1” in the tens column to 
show that the first ten numbers had been counted. That is, they 
took the “names for the numbers up through ten” and formed 
the higher numbers “through the mere combination of these” 
(Hua XII, 248; Husserl 2003, 262). In the same way, when ten 
tens were counted out, the ancient mathematicians, following 
the established decimal system, began the sequence again after 
placing a “1” in the hundreds column.  
 
2.5 Mechanization  
 
Husserl concludes that the transformation of the decimal 
system from the use of fingers and tokens, to that of language 
did “facilitate and simplify counting itself” (Hua XII, 248; 
Husserl 2003, 262). He states that, “Through these 
modifications, enumerations would become more cohesive and 
systematic and simultaneously independent of sense perceptible 
instruments other than words” (Hua XII, 248; Husserl 2003, 
262–263).  As a result of this simplification, Husserl claims that 
the mechanization of enumeration became possible. Because the 
decimal recursive system made it so effortless to generate the 
number language signs, “as soon as the systematic was mastered 
through practice, the mental process of concept formation 
automatically had to vacate the field to the external reproduction 
mechanism of name formation” (Hua XII, 250; Husserl 2003, 
265). Husserl outlines two ways in which the linguistic decimal 
system allowed for this mechanization – which is the fifth stage 
of development – to take place.  
First, this linguistic decimal number system, which is an 
extension of counting with fingers, allowed for language 
number signs to be easily brought to consciousness. Concerning 
generation of these signs, I do not have to memorize ten 
thousands distinct signs to be capable of counting to that large 
sum. Instead, I only must remember 10 number signs (0–9) and 
continually implement them in the recursive manner.13 Second, 
the decimal system, which employs words, allows for the 
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number signs to signify in a univocal manner, such that 
enumeration can be trusted – and does not have to be checked 
(or double checked) by some other means. The ancients were 
assured that the smaller numbers signs signify in an 
unambiguous manner, because they set them up in such a way 
that they have a one-to-one correspondence to their 
authentically presented numbers. By continuing the 
formulation of number signs according to the established 
recursive method beyond those that have authentically 
presentable numbers, the univocal link between the sign and 
its number is maintained, where each higher number sign 
continues to have a one-to-one correspondence to its number.  
With these ideas in mind, it is possible to understand 
Husserl‟s brief historical outline of the mechanization of 
enumeration. He first writes, “Originally one counted by a 
mental action, picking out of the group one member after 
another: one, one and one is two, two and one is three, and so 
on” (Hua XII, 250; Husserl 2003, 265). During this 
enumeration, the ancients experienced those signs as 
surrogates for their number concepts. After one had learned the 
numbers 1-9 – by following the recursive decimal pattern, it 
became easier and easier to generate the number signs. 
Ultimately, our forbearers could mechanically or „instinctually‟ 
count through the numbers without experiencing them as 
signifying their concepts, that is, without experiencing their 
conceptual content.  Husserl writes that after long practice, 
“one counted mindlessly, so to speak, or mechanically, by 
following out the sequence of names … without any reflection 
on their conceptual signification” (Hua XII, 251; Husserl 2003, 
265). This led to a further simplification, where the ancestors 
did not have to sequence every number, by picking out one 
member after another (1, 1 + 1 = 2, 2 + 1 = 3), as this sequence 
was rather “abbreviated into the sequence of terms 1, 2, 3 …” 
(Hua XII, 251; Husserl 2003, 266). 
To conclude this section of the essay, I note that, during 
his genetic-historical analysis, Husserl does not discuss any 
further steps of the development of arithmetic, which would 
have occurred after the ancients had formulated the language 
decimal number system. Most noticeably, he does not 
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investigate the mechanization of arithmetical calculation, 
whereby one follows the rules of arithmetic to calculate without 
any reference to the concepts. He simply mentions that with the 
development of the “Indic system, [the number signs] first 
assume the character of a logically perfect instrument of 
arithmetic, but also of an instrument which originated through 
scientific reflection” (Hua XII, 252; Husserl 2003, 266). The fact 
that Husserl does not discuss this development is in line with 
the goals of this passage from PA, because he asserts that he 
only seeks to clarify the historical evolution of the number 
system and is not accounting for the genesis of contemporary 
arithmetic calculation here. 
 
3. The Fusion Points with Husserl’s Mature 
Investigations 
 
As stated in the introduction, I conclude this essay by 
revealing the fusion points between Husserl‟s early 
examination of the historical development of the number 
system and his historical analysis of the generation of physics 
and geometry from KW and UG. I discuss how Husserl‟s 
analyses from the early 1890s already provided him with many 
of the tools and insights necessary to conduct his final genetic-
historical examinations. In other words, I will demonstrate that 
Husserl‟s methodology is similar during both time periods and I 
show that the results of his studies of historical genesis are 
analogous. Finally, I briefly discuss how these conclusions 
challenge the standard reading of Husserl‟s philosophy and 
thus require a rethinking of the development of his 
phenomenology. 
To reveal the methodological similarities between the 
works arising from the distinct periods of Husserl‟s life, we first 
remember that, in LZ and PA, Husserl was not concerned with 
discussing the factical historical developments of the number 
system. Instead, he disclosed the essence of the historical 
emergence of the number system. Husserl adopts a very similar 
methodology in KW and UG. In these final writings, he is not 
interested in conducting intellectual history. If Husserl were 
doing so, as David Carr writes, “he would seem to share the 
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ontological commitment of the „natural attitude‟ involved in all 
normal historical inquiry by his own accounts, i.e. the concern 
with men who actually existed” (Carr 1970, xxxii). Rather, 
Husserl is – as he was in his early works – seeking to uncover 
the essence of the historical development of the sciences, here 
physics and geometry. Even when he investigates the insights 
of, for example, Galileo and Thales, he is not examining the 
particular historical details of their discoveries, but is rather 
analyzing the insights of those thinkers as examples of the 
historical development. In UG, Husserl writes, “For, as will 
become evident here in connection with one example, our 
investigations are historical in an unusual sense, namely, in 
virtue of a thematic direction which opens up depth problems 
quite unknown to ordinary history … Our problems and 
expositions concerning Galilean geometry take on an exemplary 
significance” (Hua VI, 365; Husserl 1970b, 353). By studying 
those thinkers as examples, Husserl‟s late analysis remains 
focused on determining the essence of history and does not 
engage in a study of factical events. 
More importantly, in his final writings, Husserl executes 
his investigation by taking up and revising the idea, which 
guided his analysis of history in LZ and PA; namely, that the 
number system was generated by means of different psychic 
discoveries, which compound on each other over the course of 
time. In those early texts, he concluded that after the first and 
simplest kind of sign had been learned and often employed, the 
next and more complex kind of sign in the series could be 
discovered. Even for the early Husserl, the number system did 
not present itself to the ancients (and does not present itself to 
us) in a pre-formed manner, but rather manifests itself as the 
production of the psychic activities of distinct individuals, 
whose discoveries became maintained by future generations. In 
alignment with this, Husserl writes in UG that, “These sciences 
are not handed down ready-made in the form of documented 
sentences; they involve a lively, productively advancing 
formation of meaning, which always has the documented, as a 
sediment of earlier production, at its disposal that it deals with 
logically” (Hua VI, 375; Husserl 1970b, 365).  Here, Husserl is 
telling the reader, as Mohanty states, that geometry “is thus a 
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moving process. It is related to an entire generation of workers 
in the field sharing a common horizon” (2017, 421). With this 
guiding idea in mind, in KW and UG, Husserl sought – as he 
did in PA and LZ – to dig back up the meaning-sedimentations, 
which were required or essential for the development of the 
sciences – now, the sciences of geometry and physics. He looks 
to the distinct essential stages of the historical development of 
the sciences and reveals how the discoveries of each stage 
became sedimented and how individuals and communities 
worked from the previous stages to develop their own insights, 
which would in turn become sedimented. In sum, in his later 
writings, Husserl unearthed geometry‟s “first acquisition, out 
of first creative activities”, and traced “one set of acquisitions 
to another”, thereby discovering, “a continuous synthesis in 
which all acquisitions maintain their validity” (Hua VI, 367; 
Husserl 1970b, 355). 
Not only Husserl‟s methodology, but also many of the 
conclusions of his studies from his first and last philosophical 
writings are strikingly analogous. I here mention two 
similarities. First, we remember that Husserl concluded, in PA, 
that the invention of finger number signs did not arise from a 
theoretical interest, but rather from within a pre-theoretical 
attitude. Finger signs were developed, because there was a 
need for communicating with others about, “the events of 
practical life, in which determinate groups of such objects 
played a great role” (Hua XII, 246; Husserl 2003, 260). The 
number of sheep and the number of arrows needed to be 
determined not for a science or theory of nature, but rather 
simply for the needs of survival. The number system was 
generated out of the practical needs of the pre-theoretical and 
everyday world of the ancients. In line with this, in his mature 
works, Husserl claims that the theoretical attitude of, for 
example, the Greeks, was preceded by and arose out of “original 
natural life” (Hua VI, 327; Husserl 1970a, 281). Husserl writes 
that natural life, “can be characterized as a life of naively, 
straightforwardly directed at the world” (Hua VI, 327; Husserl 
1970a, 281). This world of natural life, that is, the world 
experienced prior to theoretical interests, is what Husserl 
famously called the “life-world” in KW (cf. Carrr 1970, xl). The 
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life-world, the late Husserl concludes, serves as the context 
within which the sciences were and continue to be developed 
and is that which the sciences study and relate back to in 
distinct ways.14 On the basis of these similarities between 
Husserl‟s insights, it can thus be concluded that Husserl‟s 
seminal idea – that the life world is the ground for all 
theoretical activities – can be traced back to his writings about 
the number system from the early 1890s. 
A second important commonality between Husserl‟s 
conclusions from his immature and final writings can be 
discovered by looking at his investigation of the consciousness 
of idealities, such as that of numbers, squares, circles, or 
formulae.  As we know, in PA, Husserl observed that the 
ancients were able to become aware of the number concepts and 
species only after they had invented signs for them. By 
“constant back-reference” from the finger signs to groups of 
objects, the forebearers discovered the generality of the 
concepts and species. Moreover, the invention and employment 
of linguistic number signs simplified and standardized their 
meanings.  Similarly, in UG, Husserl seeks to determine, “how 
does geometrical ideality proceed from its primary 
intrapersonal origin … to its ideal objectivity” (Hua VI, 369; 
Husserl 1970b, 358)? Just as he decided in PA, Husserl now 
states that the invention of certain signs is the condition of 
possibility for the consciousness of ideal objectivities. When the 
geometrical ideality takes on a linguistic garb, it has the 
possibility of becoming an ideal object. He writes, “In advance 
we see that [this realization of ideal objectivity] occurs by 
means of language, through which it receives, so to speak, its 
linguistic living body” (Hua VI, 369; Husserl 1970b, 358). From 
these insights, we see why Husserl executes his studies of the 
historical development of the number system and of geometry, 
in part, as investigations of the development of signs. As he 
concludes in the works from both time periods that signs are 
the pre-condition of our thinking of ideal numbers and shapes, 
he also concludes in all four texts that it is by accounting for the 
evolution of sign-manipulation that he can clarify the 
(historical) development of the sciences.15 
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On the basis of the above conclusions,16 it can be made 
clear why the revelation of these connecting points between the 
methods and conclusions of Husserl‟s early and final historical 
analyses challenges the current understanding of the 
development of his philosophy. Simply stated, while other 
scholars frequently claim that Husserl revolutionized his 
philosophy when he executed a historical investigation of the 
origin of physics and geometry in his very late works (e.g. 
Bernet et. al. 1993, Hopkins 2011, Mohanty 1995, Zahavi 2002), 
the paper has shown that this is not the case. This essay 
demonstrated that Husserl‟s concern with understanding the 
historical inception of the sciences was there from the start. He 
had, already in 1890, executed a robust historical analysis of 
the essential meaning-sedimentations necessary for the 
development of the number system and – by extension – the 
formal science of arithmetic. He saw that the sciences emerged 
from the pre-theoretical experiences of the world (the life world) 
and from practical demands that that world placed on mankind. 
He had, at the very first stages of his career, realized that the 
sciences are the result of a historical process, which involves 
the psychic activities of individuals and the maintaining of 
discoveries over time by intersubjective communities. These 
insights further problematize interpretations of Husserl‟s 
works, because they seem, in some ways, inconsistent with his 
critiques of Dilthey, which he famously put forward in his 1911, 
“Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (Hua XXV/2002). However, 
this is not the place to engage in an analysis of Husserl‟s 
argument against Dilthey, as it has instead been the goals of 
this essay to clarify Husserl‟s early prodigious conclusions 
about the historical inception of the number system and to 
reveal the important links those insights have to his later 
works. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 For five being the maximum number of things one can authentically present, 
see Hua XII, 114; Husserl 2003, 120. For ten being the greatest, see, in the 
respective texts, 224/ 236, and for twelve, see 192/202.  
2 What exactly a concept is for the early Husserl, is difficult to determine. 
However, I think Willard comes closest to properly elucidating Husserl‟s 
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understanding of concepts when he claims that the notions of presentation (in 
his terminology representation (Vorstellung)) and concept are equivalent, 
“without interesting exception (1984, 26) in PA. According to Willard, “a 
concept or representation is treated by Husserl as a repeatable and shareable 
thought (1984, 27).  
3 Understandably, the reader may be hesitant to accept my use of Husserl‟s 
later terminology during my discussion of his early works. Yet, on my reading, 
these terms are the only ones that would correctly convey the meaning of 
Husserl‟s historical analysis of the genesis of the number system from the 
1890s. Indeed, it is a goal of this essay to show that there is little difference 
between Husserl‟s conclusions about the origin of geometry and physics from 
his final writings and his ideas concerning the generation of the number 
system from these first texts.  
4 To the best of my knowledge, there are nine articles that discuss the tenets 
of LZ in some detail. These are: Byrne 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; D‟Angelo 2013; 
Ierna 2003; Majolino 2010, 2012; Zuh 2008, 2012. 
5 If one assumes Carlo Ierna‟s dating (2005, 36–40), Husserl wrote LZ 
immediately after composing his letter to Carl Stumpf, within which he 
admitted that the project of his forthcoming Philosophy of Arithmetic, to 
ground mathematics in the concept of number, was fundamentally misguided. 
In contrast, if one follows Willard (1986, 111–116) or Hopkins‟ (2002, 60–71) 
interpretations, he composed LZ even prior to the correspondence with 
Stumpf! 
6 While there are indeed many problems with Husserl‟s descriptions in PA, 
advocating for psychologism is not one of them. Husserl clearly did not believe 
that numbers were mental entities. Rather, he states that the collection or 
numbers of objects are objective. He writes that, "the domain of numbers 
takes in an unrestricted manifold of species", which are "the numbers in 
themselves, that is, the numbers that are in general inaccessible to us." (Hua 
XII, 260; Husserl 2003, 275). Hopkins explains, “The collection is not an 
objective (sachliche) unity grounded in the contents of the collected things. 
This is not to say, however, that Husserl thought that the unity of the 
collection is not objective. The objectivity of its unity is never in question for 
him” (Hopkins 2006, 92).  In line with this, Husserl concludes that the concept 
of number applies to the number of objects and not to the collecting act: He 
asserts that a concept applies to the object if the object possesses certain 
determinations or relations that the concept connotes. Finally, Husserl 
believed that the truth or falsity of numerical calculations were not relative to 
human psychological composition. He asserted that the truths of arithmetic 
were necessary truths, which could be demonstrated by the “analysis of 
concepts” (Hua XII, 268; Husserl 2003, 284).  
7 Important to note is that Husserl does not claim that this is an analysis of 
the historical a priori. Instead, he asserts that he is describing this evolution 
“in an aposteriori fashion” (Hua XII, 245; Husserl 2003, 259). 
8 Husserl calls only those signs that univocally signify and thus can lead us to 
assured truth and knowledge of the world in a scientific sense, “inauthentic 
presentations” (Hua XII, 351; Husserl 1994, 30–31).  
 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – XI (2) / 2019 
424 
 
 
9 Husserl later recognized that his use of the term “imitation” was misguided 
and required revision. He wrote in a footnote, “This mode of expression, 
although incorrect is nevertheless appropriate here, because it is suited to the 
mental level concerned. The psychical activities brought to bear upon sensible 
groups supply concepts which the more naïve consciousness regards as 
abstract positive moments of the respective intuitions themselves” (Hua XII, 
246 n. 1; Husserl 2003, 260 n. 2).  
10 Husserl even uses here an anthropological example to prove this point, 
stating that, “reports about counting among savage peoples confirms this” 
(Hua XII, 246; Husserl 2003, 261). 
11 This interpretation of Husserl‟s theory of surrogates is fundamentally 
different from my reading of those signs from my previous publications. In 
those previous articles, I claimed that the surrogate replaces the signified 
object by being confused for it. As a result, I asserted that Husserl had an 
“intuitive theory of meaning” in his writings from the early 1890s (In 
particular, see Byrne 2017b, 223–226).  
12 Husserl does mention that, in some cases, it is possible to skip the second 
stage of sign development: He observes that a natural sign could, without 
further ado, become a natural surrogate (Hua XII, 367; Husserl 1994, 45).  
13 A further development of linguistic number signs, which Husserl discusses 
in PA, is that it allows for one to straightforwardly compare and contrast 
number signs, because the recursivity is structured via columns (ones, tens, 
hundreds, etc.). I place a number sign in a distinct column depending upon 
how many amounts of tens that sign is supposed to signify. When I am then 
presented with two number signs, I can immediately ascertain which quantity 
is greater by first examining the left most column (which concerns the 
greatest multiples of ten) and contrast the number signs found there (778 > 
341 and 778 > (0)78). If this does not settle the matter, I continue comparing 
the number signs in the columns from left to right until I find a disparity (665 
> 663) or ultimately see them as equal (1,356 = 1,356). Concerning all of these 
points, see Hua XII, 256 –257 and 238; Husserl 2003, 281–292 and 252. 
14 In these mature works, Husserl also goes into more detail about how 
intersubjectivity plays a critical role in the historical development of the 
sciences. Because we operate within the context of the sciences, which were 
discovered and maintained by past thinkers, Husserl even concludes that 
consciousness essentially possesses an intersubjective and historical 
component. The thinkers of the past serve as the background of our individual 
and collective consciousness. Carr states that, for the Husserl of the Crisis, 
“The background of the past now becomes that of the social or intersubjective 
past, which now belongs to the individual subject by virtue of membership in 
a community” (2016, 161).  
15 Indeed, Husserl already emphasized this point in LZ, writing that the 
developments of sign usage, “do not merely accompany psychic development, 
but rather they essentially condition it, making it possible to begin with. 
Without the possibility of external, enduring marks of reference as supports 
for our memory, without the possibility of symbolic representations … there 
would simply be no higher mental life – much less, then, science” (Hua XII, 
349; Husserl 1994, 29).  
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16 I must highlight that one should by no means read these conclusions as 
entailing that there are no important differences between Husserl‟s first and 
final works. Indeed, there are. To merely mention one significant example, in 
KW, Husserl considers his genetic-historical analysis to be an essential 
introduction to phenomenology, where this conclusion holds its own set of 
problems. In contrast, Husserl‟s study of the history of the number system in 
PA is executed as an aside; it is tangential to the overarching objectives of 
that book. 
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